

IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 1D19-2819

L.T. CASE NOS.: 2018-CA-000699, 2018-CA-000822, 2018-CA-001509

STATE OF FLORIDA, GOVERNOR RON DESANTIS, ATTORNEY
GENERAL ASHLEY MOODY, AND FDLE COMMISSIONER RICHARD L.
SWEARINGEN

Appellants,

v.

CITY OF WESTON, FLORIDA, DAN DALEY, IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF THE CITY OF CORAL SPRINGS,
FLORIDA, BROWARD COUNTY, A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THE
STATE OF FLORIDA, ET AL.,

Appellees.

**BRIEF OF LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF FLORIDA, GIFFORDS
LAW CENTER TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, BRADY, EQUALITY
FLORIDA INSTITUTE, INC. AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF
APPELLEES**

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IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF *AMICI CURIAE*

Amici curiae include organizations and individuals with an interest in preventing gun violence and promoting local democratic action.

The League of Women Voters of the United States is a nonpartisan, community-based political organization that encourages the informed and active participation of citizens in government and influences public policy through education and advocacy. Founded in 1920 as an outgrowth of the struggle to win voting rights for women, it has more than 150,000 members and supporters nationwide. The League of Women Voters of Florida has thousands of members grouped into 29 local chapters.

Giffords Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence provides legal and technical assistance in support of gun violence prevention. Founded in the wake of an assault weapon massacre at a San Francisco law firm in 1993, Giffords Law Center focuses on promoting smart, effective gun laws. The organization has filed *amicus* briefs in many important gun safety cases, including *District of Columbia v. Heller*, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) and *McDonald v. City of Chicago*, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). Giffords Law Center also tracks and analyzes federal, state, and local firearms legislation, as well as legal challenges to firearms laws.

Brady is a non-partisan, non-profit organization that, since 1974, has worked to end gun violence through education, research, and legal advocacy.

Brady has a substantial interest in ensuring that laws are not interpreted or applied in ways that fail to protect communities from the devastating effects of gun violence. For over 30 years Brady has argued and filed *amicus curiae* briefs in cases concerning firearms laws, which have been cited by numerous courts including the United States Supreme Court. Brady brought a lawsuit in *Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida*, which struck down as unconstitutional a Florida law restricting doctor-patient speech.

Equality Florida Institute, Inc., is the largest civil rights organization in the State of Florida dedicated to advancing full equality for Florida's lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender community. Through education, grassroots organizing, coalition building, and the courts when necessary, Equality Florida seeks to ensure that no one in Florida suffers harassment or discrimination on the basis of their sexual orientation or gender identity. Equality Florida's work includes gun violence prevention, given the disproportionate impact of gun violence on minority communities and the massacre at Pulse Nightclub in Orlando. Equality Florida has an interest in the issue presented in this case, as it may have significant implications on Equality Florida's work in Florida.

I. INTRODUCTION

Active local political participation has long been vital to our nation’s democracy.¹ Local democratic action makes it possible for citizens to participate in policymaking within their communities—debating and passing laws that affect their friends, neighbors, and colleagues. The penalty provisions of Section 790.33 threaten local democracy through an unprecedented and unconstitutional expansion of state preemption. The Court should affirm the trial court’s holding that the penalty provisions of Section 790.33 are unconstitutional.

Over the past three decades, states have increasingly turned to preemption statutes to limit local regulation of firearms. In some respects, Section 790.33 is similar to many of these statutes. Its stated intent is “to provide uniform firearm laws in the state,” Fla. Stat. § 790.33(2)(a), and it declares “null and void” any “existing [local] ordinances, rules, or regulations” in the field of firearms and ammunition, *id.* § 790.33(1).

But in 2011, at the behest of the National Rifle Association, the Florida legislature took preemption one dangerous step further, amending Section 790.33 to subject local legislators to personal liability for their votes in the field of firearm regulation. In a subsection titled “penalties,” Section 790.33 provides

¹ See Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* 66-70 (8th ed. 1848) (extolling the virtues of the New England township).

that “[a]ny person . . . that violates the Legislature’s occupation of the whole field of regulation of firearms and ammunition . . . by enacting or causing to be enforced any local ordinance or administrative rule or regulation impinging upon such exclusive occupation of the field shall be liable.” *Id.* § 790.33(3)(a). Section 790.33 further provides that local officials who knowingly and willfully violate the statute shall be fined up to \$5,000, *id.* at 3(c), and may not be indemnified for the costs of defending themselves, *id.* at 3(d).

Amici urge the Court to affirm the trial court’s order invalidating the penalty provisions of Section 790.33. Prior to Florida’s enactment of the penalty provisions, states had never imposed penalties on local officials for their legislative activity. The State and the National Rifle Association contend that this unprecedented extension of preemption authority is necessary to prevent rogue local governments from ignoring state law. But as *Amici* discuss below, there is no evidence that local governments are ignoring or willfully violating Florida’s firearm preemption law. The primary effect of the penalty provisions will be to chill legitimate exercises of local legislative authority.

II. FLORIDA’S SECTION 790.33 IS PART OF A NATIONAL TREND TOWARD PUNITIVE PREEMPTION OF LOCAL POLICYMAKING

Section 790.33 provides that the state of Florida is “occupying the whole field of regulation of firearms and ammunition . . . to the exclusion of all existing

and future county, city, town, or municipal ordinances or any administrative regulations or rules adopted by local or state government relating thereto.” Fla. Stat. § 790.33(1). This type of law—commonly referred to as a “preemption statute”—has become an increasingly popular tool for state governments and lobbyists in recent decades. The expansion of Section 790.33 in 2011 to include harsh penalties represents a new trend of *punitive* preemption statutes that has emerged in the context of firearm regulation. These statutes not only preempt local policymaking authority, but also threaten municipalities and elected officials with civil or even criminal liability for legislating in the field of firearms.

The recent escalation of firearm preemption laws has occurred against the backdrop of decades of successful innovation by local governments. As rates of gun crime skyrocketed in densely-populated cities, the local legislators representing the residents of those cities experimented with policy solutions that may not have been necessary in sparsely-populated rural areas or appropriate for application statewide.² For example, cities were the first to regulate the manufacture and sale of small, inexpensive, and poorly-made handguns—known

² See Joseph Blocher, *Firearm Localism*, 123 YALE L.J. 82, 102–05 (2013).

as “Saturday-night specials,” or “junk guns”—which were disproportionately used in crime in urban areas.³

These local policy experiments have often trickled up. Eight states, for example, followed their cities’ lead by passing statewide legislation regulating junk guns.⁴ Similarly, in the 1990s, cities passed laws requiring that guns be sold with trigger locks. State legislatures soon followed suit, passing similar legislation at the state level. *See, e.g.*, San Jose, Cal., Mun. Code Ch. 10.32.112–115 (1997), followed by Cal. Penal Code § 12088.1 (1999). Eventually, these city and state laws formed the basis for the federal law that prohibits licensed dealers from selling handguns without including a trigger lock or similar “safety devices.” *See* 18 U.S.C. § 922(z), amended by Pub. L. 109-92, §§ 5(c)(1), 6(a), Oct. 26, 2005.

These successes spurred the National Rifle Association (“NRA”) to aggressively advocate for statewide preemption as a means to roll back the fruits

³ Duke Helfand, *Two-Pronged Attack on Guns Launched*, L.A. Times, Apr. 3, 1996; *see also* Webster et al., *Effects of Maryland's Law Banning “Saturday Night Special” Handguns on Homicides*, American Journal of Epidemiology, Vol. 155, at 406 (2002).

⁴ Cal. Penal Code §§ 16380, 16900, 17140, 31900-32110; Cal. Code Regs. tit. 11, §§ 4047–4074; D.C. Code Ann. § 7-2505.04; D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 24, § 2323; Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 134-15(a); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/24-3(A)(h); Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety, §§ 5-405, 5-406; Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140, §§ 123, 131½, 131¾; 501 Mass. Code Regs §§ 7.01–7.16; 940 Mass. Code Regs. §§ 16.01-16.09; Minn. Stat. §§ 624.712, 624.716; N.Y. Penal Law § 400.00(12-a); N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 9, § 482.1–482.7.

of local policy experimentation.⁵ Starting in the late 1970s and early 1980s, a handful of states passed laws preempting specific aspects of firearms regulation.⁶ By the end of the 1980s, at least ten states had enacted broad preemption statutes.⁷ Florida was one of these states: it passed the initial version of Section 790.33 in 1987. The original Section 790.33 described the field that the state legislature exclusively occupied, but it did not include the penalty provisions at issue in the State’s appeal. Instead, like other preemption statutes at the time, it left enforcement to parties who could challenge the validity of an allegedly preempted local ordinance in court.⁸ Today, 45 states have adopted statutes that preempt at least some aspect of firearm or ammunition regulation.⁹

In 2011, the Florida legislature—with the drafting assistance of NRA lobbyist Marion Hammer¹⁰—amended Section 790.33 to include the

⁵ See NRA-ILA, Firearm Preemption Laws, <https://www.nraila.org/get-the-facts/preemption-laws/> (last visited Dec. 15, 2019).

⁶ See, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 609.67 (1977) (preempting regulation of machine guns); Md. Code Ann., Envir. § 3-105(a)(3) (1982) (preempting regulation of noise control for shooting sports clubs).

⁷ W. Va. Code § 8-12-5a (1982); S.D. Codified Laws § 9-19-20 (1983); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 65.870 (1984); Alaska Stat. § 29.35.145(a) (1985); Del. Code Ann. tit. 22, § 111 (1985); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:1796 (1985); N.D. Cent. Code § 62.1-01-03 (1985); S.C. Code Ann. § 23-31-510 (1986); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 790.33(1987); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. title 25, § 2011 (1989).

⁸ See Firearms and ammunition—Uniform Act, 1987 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 87-23 (West).

⁹ Giffords Law Center, *Preemption of Local Laws*, <https://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/other-laws-policies/preemption-of-local-laws> (last visited Dec. 18, 2019).

¹⁰ Greg Allen, *In Florida, Cities Challenge State On Gun Regulation Laws*, NPR, <https://www.npr.org/2018/04/02/598042099/in-florida-cities-challenge-state-on-gun-regulation-laws> (Apr. 2, 2018); see also Mike Spies, The N.R.A. Lobbyist Behind Florida’s Pro-Gun Policies, *New Yorker* (Mar. 5, 2018) (discussing Hammer’s influence in the Florida

unprecedented penalty provisions at issue here, a dangerous change in the course of preemption law. The amended Section 790.33 appeared to be the first preemption statute in the United States that penalized local officials in their individual capacities for their votes on legislation. For the first time, a local legislator could be *personally punished* for voting to enact (or “causing to be enforced”) an ordinance that addresses local gun violence. As the NRA’s Ms. Hammer made clear in a recent letter criticizing the court’s decision below, the purpose of the NRA’s amendment to Section 790.33 was to punish “anti-gun public officials.”¹¹ Ms. Hammer complained that the trial court’s decision had given these local officials a “get-out-of-jail-free card.”¹²

In the wake of the enactment of Section 790.33’s penalty provisions, a number of other states amended their firearm preemption laws to penalize local legislators for their votes. In 2014, Mississippi augmented its firearm preemption statute by subjecting local officials to a \$1,000 fine for voting for an ordinance

legislature). Ms. Hammer also helped the Florida legislature draft another punitive statute—which subjected Florida doctors to, among other punishments, a fine of up to \$10,000 and permanent license revocation for asking patients whether they own firearms or have firearms in their homes. *See Wollschlaeger v. Governor, Fla.*, 848 F.3d 1293, 1303 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc). The Eleventh Circuit ruled *en banc* that the statute’s prohibition on doctors inquiring about their patients’ possession of firearms violated the First Amendment. *Id.* at 1318–19.

¹¹ Marion P. Hammer, *Letter to USF & NRA Members and Friends*, Jul. 29, 2019, available at <https://www.nraila.org/articles/20190729/florida-alert-court-rules-public-officials-cant-be-punished-for-violating-the-law>.

¹² *Id.*

that conflicts with the state statute, plus “all reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred by the party bringing the suit.” Miss. Code. Ann. § 45-9-53(5)(c). The Mississippi preemption statute, like Section 790.33, also prohibits the use of public funds to defend or reimburse local officials for legal expenses incurred in defending themselves.

In 2016, Arizona enacted a law making local officials personally liable for a fine of up to \$50,000 for “knowing and willful” violations of the state law. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3108. Local officials are also subject to termination. And in Kentucky, the state recently amended its firearm preemption statute to *criminalize* violations of the state’s preemption of firearms regulation. The amended statute declares that “[a] violation of [the state’s preemption of firearms regulation] by a public servant shall” constitute “official misconduct,” a misdemeanor. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 65.870 (6). The statute further provides that local legislators are liable for the attorney’s fees and costs of those who successfully challenge local action that violates the preemption statute “or the spirit thereof.” *Id.* § 65.870 (4)(a).

The 2011 penalty provisions added to Section 790.33 are thus in the vanguard of an alarming trend. As discussed below, this unprecedented approach to enforcing state preemption law is an unnecessary threat to local democracy.

III. THE PENALTY PROVISIONS OF SECTION 790.33 WILL CHILL LEGITIMATE EXERCISES OF LOCAL LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY

Section 790.33's penalty provisions will deter local legislators from legitimately exercising their legislative authority. Indeed, Florida courts have recognized that given the "penalties that can apply if missteps are made in the promulgation of policies in this field . . . apprehension is understandable." *Fla. Carry, Inc. v. Univ. of Fla.*, 180 So. 3d 137, 154 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (Makar, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result). Section 790.33's harsh provisions will deter local legislators from enacting legislation that may be perfectly valid under Section 790.33. For example, a local legislator may seek to enact a zoning ordinance preventing individuals from manufacturing goods—including firearms—in residential areas. Such an ordinance may well be valid under Section 790.33, which permits "[z]oning ordinances that encompass firearms businesses along with other businesses," so long as they are not "designed for the purpose of restricting or prohibiting the sale, purchase, transfer, or manufacture of firearms or ammunition as a method of regulating firearms or ammunition." *See* Att'y General Op. 2016-06 (opining that regulating manufacturing as a home occupation is not preempted); *cf. Peter Garrett Gunsmith, Inc. v. City of Dayton*, 98 S.W.3d 517 (Ky. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that zoning ordinance restricting locations in which gun shops could operate did

not violate Kentucky's preemption statute). Nonetheless, rather than risk penalty under the statute, the local legislator may instead avoid enacting such a zoning ordinance altogether. With local representatives immobilized by fear of enacting even legitimate legislation, Florida citizens will be deprived of the safety benefits that zoning regulations provide.

Contrary to the NRA's suggestion, local legislators cannot avoid punishment by simply declining to enact preempted ordinances, because the question of whether legislation violates Section 790.33 is often the subject of considerable disagreement. Indeed, legislators, courts, and the Attorney General often reach contrary conclusions as to the application and scope of Section 790.33. In *Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. City of S. Miami*, 812 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2002), for example, the City of South Miami passed an ordinance requiring locking devices on firearms stored in the city. The City sought guidance from the Attorney General, who opined that the ordinance was not preempted by Section 790.33. *See* Att'y General Op. 2000-42. The NRA sued the City challenging the ordinance, and the Circuit Court ruled in the City's favor, also determining the ordinance did not violate Section 790.33. Finally, on appeal, the Third District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded the trial court's decision, determining the ordinance *was* preempted. *Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. City of S. Miami*, 812 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2002). Facing the potential

for disagreement at every level, it would be rational for a local legislator to simply avoid legislating entirely, rather than risk possible punishment dependent on the outcome of hotly-contested litigation. This outcome is even more likely given “[i]t is no defense” that a local government entity was “acting in good faith or upon advice of counsel.” § 790.33(3)(b).

Similarly, in *Florida Carry, Inc. v. University of Florida*, the Circuit Court upheld the University of Florida’s policy prohibiting firearms in university housing. No. 12014-CA-104, 2014 WL 11256284, at *1 (Fla. 8th Cir. Ct. July 30, 2014). The First District Court of Appeal upheld the lower court’s decision in three separately-written opinions, determining that the University’s policy was not preempted under Section 790.33. 180 So. 3d at 148. Concurring in the result, Judge Markar wrote that he would have avoided the preemption issue altogether, noting the “complex web of Florida’s firearms laws, with an evolving state and federal overlay of constitutional rights,” and the “difficult statutory interpretation questions” implicated. *Id.* at 155. *See also Fla. Carry, Inc. v. Univ. of N. Fla.*, 133 So. 3d 966 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (*en banc*) (reversing the Circuit Court on preemption issue in seven separate opinions). The frequent disagreement over the interpretation of Section 790.33 increases the risk that local legislators will avoid enacting legitimate legislation, depriving Florida citizens of the benefits of such policies.

Most importantly, Section 790.33's harsh penalty provisions will deter local legislators from experimenting with *any* solutions directed to the problem of gun violence, depriving Floridians of ordinances promoting their safety and security. As the examples discussed above illustrate, the penalty provisions will discourage local legislators from experimenting with or enacting safety-aimed policies—such as restricting firearm manufacturing in homes or proscribing students from carrying firearms on college campuses—even when such policies may not be preempted.

IV. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE PENALTY PROVISIONS ARE NECESSARY TO ENFORCE THE PREEMPTION LAW OR TO PROTECT SECOND AMENDMENT RIGHTS

The chilling effects of the penalty provisions are undesirable and unnecessary. Florida may pass laws preempting local regulation—and may permit individuals to sue to enforce such laws—without subjecting local legislators to individual liability for their legislative activity. The State's and the NRA's assertions to the contrary are meritless.

In its opening brief, the State warns that “[i]f allowed to stand, the [trial court's] decision will not only invite the development of a patchwork regulatory regime in the area of firearms but also render the Legislature impotent to deter

power grabs by local officials in other areas.”¹³ But the remainder of the State’s brief is devoid of any argument or evidence that the penalty provisions of Section 790.33 are necessary to prevent the development of “a patchwork regulatory scheme in the area of firearms.” Nor does the State explain or support its suggestion that “power grabs by local officials” are a problem in other policy areas. In short, the State defends its unprecedented and unconstitutional expansion of preemption authority by pointing to problems that do not exist.

Similarly, the NRA argues in its amicus brief that the unprecedented penalty provisions of Section 790.33 “are necessary to preserve and protect the Florida Legislature’s prerogative to occupy the field of firearm regulation to preempt unlawful local action.”¹⁴ “[L]ocal governments and government officials,” the NRA alleges, “knowingly—and contemptuously—violated state law with impunity.”¹⁵ As with the State’s assertions concerning the need for the penalty provisions, the NRA’s claims are baseless.

The NRA points to two examples of the “contemptuous” violations of state law that purportedly plagued Florida prior to 2011, but neither involves local governments ignoring or willfully violating the State’s firearm preemption law.

¹³ Appellants’ Br. at 2.

¹⁴ NRA Amicus at 2.

¹⁵ *Id.* at 1.

First, citing a “Final Bill Analysis” of the 2011 amendments by the Florida House Judiciary Committee, the NRA asserts that a local government had enacted an ordinance “prohibiting high-capacity ammunition magazines.”¹⁶ But no such ordinance was ever enacted. On the contrary, the local government to which the Committee’s analysis refers—Palm Beach County—deliberatively decided *not* to vote on the proposed ordinance.¹⁷ Instead, a County Commissioner proposed, in deference to Florida’s firearm preemption law, a “resolution calling for the Florida Legislature to pass a state ban on the sale of the high-capacity ammunition magazines.”¹⁸ The County’s approach evinced respect, not “contempt,” for state law.

The NRA’s other example is the lawsuit it filed nearly 20 years ago against the City of South Miami in which it challenged a local regulation requiring the use of locking devices on firearms. *See City of S. Miami*, 812 So. 2d at 504. But even that case—the only one the NRA cites in support of its argument that punitive preemption is necessary—does not show that local officials were ignoring Florida law or taking frivolous positions in litigation. As discussed

¹⁶ *Id.* at 4.

¹⁷ Fla. H. Judiciary Comm., H.B. 45 Final Bill Analysis, 2011 Leg., 113th Sess., at 3 n.14.

¹⁸ A. Reid, *PBC Gun Control Advocates Suffer More Setbacks*, SOUTH FLORIDA SUNSENTINEL, Feb. 15, 2011, <https://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/fl-xpm-2011-02-15-fl-gun-control-palm-20110215-story.html>.

above, the City of South Miami had, before it was sued by the NRA, solicited the views of the Florida Attorney General, who had opined that the City's locking ordinance was not preempted under Section 790.33. Moreover, the trial court ruled in the City's favor. *See id.* at 504. Although the Florida Court of Appeal for the Third District ultimately reversed the trial court, it expressly recognized the good faith of the City in defending its ordinance, explaining that the case involved "various well-meaning litigants eye-ball to eye-ball across counsel table," with "the City wondering whether its ordinance has been preempted." *Id.* at 504-05.

The NRA also justifies the penalty provisions on the basis that they are necessary to protect Second-Amendment rights. Echoing its inflammatory language concerning alleged violations of Florida state law, the NRA charges that "many" local governments have "knowingly and contemptuously" violated the Second Amendment.¹⁹ But, again, the two examples the NRA cites do not support its disparagement of local governments. First, the *City of South Miami* litigation concerned a city ordinance passed in 2000, several years before the U.S. Supreme Court decided *District of Columbia v. Heller*, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), and *McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill.*, 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010). At the time, no

¹⁹ NRA Amicus Br. at 21.

court had held that a similar ordinance violated the Second Amendment. Indeed, until the Supreme Court decided *McDonald* in 2010, it was unclear if the Second Amendment even applied to state and local legislation. See *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 620 n.23; *McDonald*, 561 U.S. at 749.

As for the NRA's example of the proposed Palm Beach County ordinance regulating high-capacity ammunition magazines (which, as explained above, the County did not even enact), that regulation would not have violated the Second Amendment. Six federal circuit courts have considered Second-Amendment challenges to similar regulations of high-capacity ammunition magazines; each circuit upheld the challenged law. See *Worman v. Healey*, 922 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 2019); *Assoc. of New Jersey Rifle and Pistol Clubs, Inc. v. Att'y General New Jersey*, 910 F.3d 106 (3rd Cir. 2018); *Kolbe v. Hogan*, 849 F.3d 114 (4th Cir. 2017); *N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Cuomo*, 804 F.3d 242 (2d Cir. 2015); *Friedman v. City of Highland Park*, 784 F.3d 406 (7th Cir. 2015); *Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II)*, 670 F.3d 1244 (D.C. Cir. 2011). While the NRA may disagree with all of those decisions, it cannot say with a straight face that a legislator proposing, considering, or voting on a law restricting high-capacity ammunition magazines is "knowingly and contemptuously" violating the Second Amendment.

In sum, these simply are not examples of rogue local officials willfully violating state law or constitutional rights. On the contrary, the NRA's examples show local legislators working in good faith on solutions to difficult policy problems. The State's and the NRA's effort to punish local legislators for pursuing such solutions underscores the importance of legislative immunity.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, *Amici* respectfully request the urge the Court to affirm the trial court's order.

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Respectfully submitted,

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**Pro hac vice motion pending*

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that the undersigned electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Courts on January 2, 2020, by using the E-Filing Portal, which will send a notice of electronic filings to all counsel of record.

/s/ Philip R. Stein

Philip R. Stein

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that this computer-generated brief is prepared in Times New Roman 14-point font and complies with the typeface requirements of Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.210(a).

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